ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES

OVERVIEW

This annex addresses the technologies that enable NBC proliferation. It provides an overview, not a detailed technical appraisal. It begins with nuclear, biological, chemical, and weapon technologies and their military significance. Next, the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are compared. Attention is then given to the delivery system and other technologies that facilitate development and use of NBC weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

The Manhattan Project that developed the nuclear weapons employed in World War II identified the two primary routes to a nuclear capability. The first weapon used in conflict, at Hiroshima, was a gun-assembly weapon that propelled a subcritical mass of uranium-235 (U-235) into a second, also subcritical, mass of U-235 producing the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion. The second weapon, used at Nagasaki, was an implosion weapon. In such a device, an outer shell of chemical high-explosives surrounds a subcritical sphere of fissionable nuclear material, for example, plutonium-239 (Pu-239). Precise detonation results in an implosion that produces a critical mass and the resulting nuclear explosion.

U-235 and Pu-239 are the optimal weapons grade nuclear materials for a weapon. However, mixed isotope plutonium (reactor grade material) can be used in nuclear weapons; such a device would be less efficient and might have a less predictable yield. A weapon using nonweapons-grade plutonium was successfully detonated in a 1960s test. Another alternative would be a radiological weapon that employed conventional explosives or other means to scatter radioactive material. Such a weapon would not produce a nuclear yield; however, it could spread contamination. While such weapons would have less military significance than devices that result in nuclear detonations, radiological weapons have enormous potential for intimidation. Targeting a nuclear reactor in an antagonist's territory to produce an accident releasing nuclear material would be another option.

There are hundreds of nuclear reactors and many more nuclear sources throughout the world, such as radiological materials used in hospitals. Both international and national measures control these items and associated materials and thereby contribute to proliferation prevention. However, post-war investigations in occupied Iraq showed that at least some of these control regimes could be circumvented, even by a state that was a nominal adherent to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Near-term concerns include the accumulation of large quantities of plutonium from reactors that is intended for reprocessing and/or storage, and the status of nuclear materials in the New Independent States that previously comprised the Soviet Union.

Military Significance

A nuclear detonation releases vast amounts of energy which is manifested as blast effects (roughly 50 percent of the total energy), heat (35 percent), and nuclear radiation (15 percent). Height-of-burst influences effects. If the fireball does not touch the ground, there may not be militarily significant fallout. At higher altitudes, the Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) from a nuclear weapon -- a powerful radio wave -- can damage electronic equipment at considerable distances. If launched on a theater ballistic missile to very high altitudes, even a single nuclear device might damage or destroy the communications and intelligence satellites whose importance was demonstrated during the Gulf War.

There are many uncertainties associated with potential proliferant employment of nuclear weapons. We do not know how successful the proliferant will be in implementing fusing, yield enhancement, delivery system accuracy, and other technologies. For immediate purposes, it is reasonable to use a baseline case of a weapon using 1950s vintage U.S. technology -- a simple fission weapon with a tens of kilotons yield that could be delivered by aircraft or tactical missiles. Such weapons would have been devastating if detonated on the small number of ports (two primary facilities) and airfields that provided critical support during Operation Desert Storm.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

Chemical weapons (CW) are compounds used in military operations or as terrorist weapons to kill, incapacitate, or seriously injure personnel through their chemical properties. Most CW agents useful as military weapons are not gases, although poison gas is a term commonly used. While chlorine gas was used in World War I, most agents are liquids, which facilitate munitions loading and contribute to stability in storage and transportation. When employed, these liquids are dispersed as droplets. These droplets can either penetrate the skin or vaporize and become a respiration hazard.

Chemical agents are either persistent or nonpersistent. Persistent agents may last from hours to days. Nonpersistent agents last minutes to hours. Agents can be lethal or nonlethal. The effects induced can include blistering, choking, blocking the ability of body tissue to absorb oxygen, convulsions, and paralysis. Reports indicate that the 1995 Japanese subway incident involved Sarin, an agent that attacks the nervous system.

The precursor chemicals and intermediate stages in the production process for two classical CW agents, nerve and blister agents, have both agricultural and industrial uses. For example, Thiodiglycol, which has been used to produce ball-point pen ink, can be converted to mustard agent by a simple (single) chlorination step. The technology and most of the production equipment, moreover, even the military hardware necessary for delivery and dissemination, are dual-use. Detection and discrimination between legitimate and illegal production are difficult. Facilities producing pesticides, insecticides, and fire retardant chemicals could be converted to CW production. There are strong external similarities between civilian and military facilities, although the latter may have observable security measures such as restricted access areas and fences, and possibly storage areas used for chemical munitions. Knowledgeable personnel are readily available; a relatively small number of chemical engineers and technicians are needed for production of chemical weapons.

CW-suitable dual-use delivery systems are readily available ranging from SCUD missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to sophisticated cruise and ballistic missiles. If need be, crop duster aircraft and simple spray generators can be readily adapted for delivery of a variety of agents. The quantities of chemical agent required are relatively small when compared to industrial production of similar commercial chemicals, which poses significant problems for detection. The low technology required lends itself to proliferant and even potential terrorist use. Terrorists could employ CW agents in a variety of means utilizing simple containers such as glass bottles, commercial compressed gas bottles, or propane tanks.

Military Significance

Chemical weapons are the only NBC munitions that have been used in post-World War II large-scale conflicts, most recently during the Iran-Iraq war. Consequently, there is cause for concern that proliferators may perceive that international responses (ranging from sanctions to military action) are less likely, given the use of CW.

CW impacts military operations in a number of ways. Large numbers of people (combatants and civilians) can be killed if suitable protective equipment or shelters are not available and properly utilized. There may be large numbers of nonfatal casualties. This was the characteristic experience when CW was employed during World War I. The volume of injured personnel can overwhelm the military medical evacuation and treatment system, impacting operations.

If CW employment is anticipated, forces are required to operate in protective ensembles that degrade operational performance, especially under adverse climatic conditions. Even though forces using appropriate protective equipment may be immune to CW effects, their ability to accomplish tasks is greatly reduced. Furthermore, equipment, facilities, and territory are contaminated. This impacts the ability of forces to maneuver. It also can have a major effect on ports, airfields, and other essential facilities that support operations.

Once CW use occurs, decontamination operations are required. These operations can be time-consuming. They may require forces to be diverted from other missions. In some instances, current technology decontamination equipment damages equipment. Perhaps most significantly, psychological effects impacting the ability of personnel to perform their missions can occur.

CW employment involves a number of factors, including agent type; the dissemination method (and its dispersion efficiency); droplet size; and meteorological conditions, including temperature, wind speed and direction, and inversion conditions. Agent dispersion can be very dependent on environmental factors, such as wind direction and speed.

Chemical agents can be used as limited area effects (battlefield) or large area effects weapons, to include areas with civilian populations. Unlike nuclear or biological weapons (BW), effective chemical agent attacks sometimes require significant numbers of munitions to achieve large area coverage. This can be an advantage in some situations since it means that the consequences of CW use are more predictable and hence more readily integrated into war plans.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Weapons and Weapons Technology

Biological weapons employ living agents or toxins produced by such agents or synthetically to kill or injure humans, domestic animals, and crops. Biological weapons are not as well understood as their chemical and nuclear counterparts. It has been more than two decades since the United States terminated its offensive BW programs. U.S. forces have never been attacked with BW.

BW agents can be disseminated in a number of ways -- insects, the contamination of water and food supplies, and by aerosol. The dissemination of infectious agents through aerosols, either as droplets from liquid suspensions or by small particles from dry powders, is by far the most efficient method. Delivery means for such munitions include artillery, missiles, and aerial sprayers. These aerosol weapons cause death or injuries when they are inhaled. Arthropod vectors and the contamination of food and water supplies could also be significant modes of dissemination for BW agents.

Genetic engineering and other new technologies now can be employed to overcome product deficiencies in the classic agents and toxins normally addressed in such discussions. Moreover, toxins that exist in nature in small amounts were once considered not to be potential threat agents because of their limited availability. Today, however, a number of natural toxins conceivably could be produced through genetic engineering techniques in sufficient quantities for an adversary to consider producing them as an offensive weapon. There are many microorganisms, or their metabolic byproducts (toxins), that meet all of the criteria for effective BW agents.

Biological weapons and chemical weapons are sometimes treated together as a single category of threat. A key difference is that BW agents characteristically have lethal effects over much larger areas.

There are two basic types of biological munitions: point source bomblets and line source tanks. Within each category there can be multiple shapes and configurations. BW munitions and delivery systems are very interdependent; frequently the munition dictates the delivery system. With the evolution of sophisticated line source hardware, the agent, the munition, and delivery system must be carefully integrated. The effectiveness of BW munitions is very dependent on meteorological conditions.

Different factors are relevant for potential terrorist use of BW and for deliberate attacks against civilian populations in urban areas. The quantity of agent could be small (a single gram, possibly less), production and purification methods extremely simple, and the dissemination means simple-to-complex. All elements of such a program might go undetected until use has occurred. Individual buildings are potential targets. Off-the-shelf aerosol generators could be used to disperse a BW agent into the air inlet ducts of the target structure. Especially in the case of toxins, much less toxic agents could be employed and/or quantities of agent required would be much less than for other targets.

Terrorist consideration of BW agents is not unknown; in 1989, a cell of the German Baader-Meinhof gang was discovered with a culture of Clostridium botulinum. Contamination of food and water supplies or aerosol dissemination are possible. Because only relatively small quantities of relatively impure agent would be required for terrorist use, agent selection is almost unlimited.

In the United States and other Western countries, public and private concern for the safety of the work force and the surrounding community in the years following World War II resulted in the development of elaborate containment facilities for conducting infectious disease research. Fort Detrick Biological Warfare Research and Development Laboratories were pioneers in development of these safety concepts and procedures. Other countries do not necessarily share these safety concerns.

The same point holds for the size of the facilities used to develop biological weapons. A state might elect to build large-scale facilities unique to this function, as was done in the United States prior to 1969. Such facilities would be, in principle, more susceptible to detection. However, there is no requirement to do this. The lower cost (by a considerable margin) and less readily observable approach would be to employ an in-place civilian facility as the site for agent production.

Production equipment will vary, depending on the quantity of material desired, the methods selected for production, and the agent selected. Unlike CW agents, where production is measured in the tons, BW agent production is measured in the kilograms to tens of kilograms. Assessments of BW verification sometimes assume that the problem is to detect production of as little as 10 kilograms of BW agent.

There is nothing unique about the types of equipment (or technology) that might be employed in a BW program. For example, biological safety cabinets have been adopted universally for biomedical research as well as commercial production of infectious disease products, reagents, and so forth. Fermenters, centrifuges, purification, and other laboratory equipment are used not only by the biomedical community, but have other academic and commercial applications as well, such as wineries, milk plants, pharmaceutical houses, and agricultural products. Production of beer, antibodies, enzymes, and other therapeutic products, such as insulin and growth hormone, involves the use of fermenters ranging in size from 10,000 to 1 million liters; such fermenters could produce significant quantities of BW agent. Key technologies have an intrinsic dual-use character.

Military Significance

Biological weapons can inflict casualties over a very large area. Much of their military effectiveness is due to this area coverage. A number of additional factors impact on the effectiveness of a BW attack. It may not be immediately evident that an attack has taken place. The attack may employ novel agents that are not well-characterized and for which there may not be vaccines or treatments. Decontamination may be difficult if deployed sensors cannot detect the agents utilized.

Even if immediate effects on military personnel are mitigated, perhaps through the use of protective masks, the impact on affected civilian populations may have a major effect as civilians evacuate and military forces render assistance to afflicted personnel. Furthermore, personnel effectiveness is reduced when the protective mask is worn, and psychological impact may be significant.

Biological weapons are a horrifying reality. A number of states have BW programs. Experience in the Gulf War showed the hazards our forces might face during contingency operations:

COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPON EFFECTS

All three types of NBC weapons have effects that can cause damage or contamination over large areas. Each of these areas would be sufficient to cover the typical port or airfield that might support U.S. forces during a major regional conflict. The example presented below is biased against chemical and biological munitions. A line source carried by an aircraft might provide 10 times as much coverage for a biological munition, particularly if weather conditions were favorable.

Some differences between the effects of NBC weapons merit attention. While all three types of weapon can kill or injure personnel and spread contamination over broad areas, only nuclear weapons can destroy equipment and facilities. Some military effects are weather-dependent -- dispersal of chemical and biological agents and the distribution of fallout or radiological contamination.

Military efficacy can vary over time. Once chemical or biological weapons are first used, information becomes available concerning the agents used, which allows agent-specific antidotes to be identified and protective postures adopted. While some protective measures can be implemented subsequent to initial use of nuclear weapons, such as dispersal of forces, the efficacy of nuclear weapons does not have the same variation over time.

Particularly in situations in which a small number of NBC weapons are delivered through unconventional means, attacks may be anonymous. In the case of biological warfare, the existence of an attack may be open to question -- the cause of the disease may not be obvious.

Any state that has biomedical or chemical research and production facilities or that has radio-therapeutic centers in hospitals has the basic technologies needed to develop biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. Nuclear weapons are more difficult to produce. More weapon- and program-unique technologies are needed. However, the cases of Iraq and South Africa suggest that programs designed to produce a small number of weapons are feasible and may be difficult to detect.



The incremental costs of proliferation vary. Little additional investment may be needed to transform a civilian chemical or biomedical capability into a weapons program, particularly one for low-rate production. More weapon-program-specific costs are likely to be associated with nuclear proliferation. The same cost relationships hold on a per-weapon basis. Nuclear weapons are significantly more expensive to produce than chemical and biological munitions.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Introduction

A number of delivery system options are available for terrorist or paramilitary delivery of NBC weapons. States that want to employ NBC weapons to support military operations are likely to make use of combat aircraft, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles.

Combat Aircraft

Combat aircraft are already available in every country that has or is suspected of acquiring NBC weapons -- and are being modernized in most. Such aircraft can carry more payload than either ballistic or cruise missiles. Piloted aircraft offer flexibility in delivering NBC weapons and perhaps superior capabilities in dispersing chemical or biological agents. They can be used effectively in most circumstances, if they can be affordably employed in sufficient numbers to overcome modern air defenses. If involved in a conflict with the United States, they must also overcome U.S. offensive air capabilities. However, even small numbers of aircraft armed with NBC weapons can cause significant damage.

Major investments are required to acquire and sustain a combat aircraft capability and the associated infrastructure, training, operations, support, and technology improvements needed to maintain a viable ability to penetrate modern air defenses -- which are increasingly effective and widely available. Transfer of stealth technology could strengthen the effectiveness of combat aircraft in delivering NBC weapons -- but not simply or cheaply. Such high technology combat aircraft would be very expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain -- and would become particularly high value military targets, inherently dependent on fixed, usually well known, airfields -- vulnerable to attack in any sustained regional conflict. (Harriers and other vertical take-off and landing aircraft are exceptions to this generalization.)

For most nations developing NBC weapons, advanced fighters and strike aircraft offer the capability to strike at greater range than their current ballistic or cruise missiles. The market for advanced aircraft is highly competitive, involving economic, political, and military considerations that preclude any significant reduction in the availability and modernization of such aircraft that would permit NBC weapons delivery to ranges between 500 and 1500 km. Military aircraft capable of delivering NBC weapons to greater ranges are generally limited to the industrial powers; this is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. Note, however, that the effective range of an NBC delivery system aircraft can be extended if the weapon is carried as an air-launched cruise missile.

Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles offer potential proliferators several advantages over manned aircraft -- as evidenced by the fact that over two-thirds of the NBC weapons states of concern also have programs to acquire them. They are less expensive to acquire and sustain than a modern air force. Their mobility makes them far less vulnerable to U.S. offensive operations than manned aircraft with their ties to fixed air bases. Perhaps of most importance, until the Gulf War, the absence of any defense against ballistic missiles offered them a free ride to their targets. Furthermore, we can anticipate that states with more launch capability than demonstrated by Iraq during the Gulf War will launch large scale salvo attacks against high priority targets, with smaller numbers of missiles being directed against targets of opportunity. Salvo attacks maximize damage and compensate for the inaccuracy of older technology missiles.

The potential for coercion is perhaps the long-range ballistic missile's greatest value to a proliferator and the greatest challenge for those seeking to restrain that state. Beyond their coercive value in threatening distant cities and ability to drain military resources seeking to counter that coercive threat, missiles -- if sufficiently accurate and/or lethal -- can also pose major direct military threats.

From the perspective of the leader of a state, ballistic missiles are an effective instrument -- even the weapon of choice -- to threaten the rear of U.S. and coalition forces in the face of U.S. air superiority. Missiles are much less expensive than acquiring and maintaining a world-class air force competitive with U.S. military aviation; missiles with a low profile infrastructure and mobile launchers are much less vulnerable than aircraft to U.S. offensive operations; missiles are easier to control than other means of deep strike; and even when armed with high explosives, missiles can have considerable psychological effects when used against urban targets.

Attempts may be made to accelerate development by purchasing ballistic missile technology and technological know-how from other countries. While technological aspects of developing ballistic missiles are challenging, they are well and widely known. Thus, attempts to block a determined adversary are likely only to slow development. As more nations begin deploying ballistic missile defenses, their adversaries will likely begin developing countermeasures to these defenses, which need not be expensive or involve high technology, to create difficulties for the defense, especially for missiles targeted to terrorize civilians.

Cruise Missiles

Article two of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty provides a useful definition: "A cruise missile is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight." Cruise missiles may be even less expensive and more accurate than ballistic missiles, and their smaller size may make them an even more elusive target for counterforce operations. Furthermore, they may also be more difficult to defend against than manned aircraft because of their lower radar cross-sections. Even though short-range anti-ship cruise missiles are already widely available, there are only a few countries that possess long-range land-attack cruise missiles. However, there are no technological barriers preventing developing nations from developing or purchasing these relatively inexpensive, potentially very accurate delivery systems.

Even unsophisticated unpiloted aerodynamic vehicles -- or cruise missiles -- could be configured to accomplish a variety of missions. Such aerodynamic vehicles are widely available, inexpensive (to purchase, support, and operate), small, mobile, easy to hide, capable of being launched from a variety of launch platforms (air, ground, ship, or submarine) without significant modifications to the missile, potentially hard to detect in-flight, and (with global positioning systems (GPS)) accurate to a few tens of meters. Depending on the details of the design, they could be difficult to detect, track, and defeat with current active defenses.

Although they can be designed to deliver their payloads to great distances (both the United States and the former Soviet Union built cruise missiles with range capabilities of more than 3,000 km), the majority of aerodynamic vehicles can only achieve short ranges of less than 250 km. It should be noted that the effective range of an aircraft-carried cruise missile is a function of both the aircraft's range (when carrying this load) and the missile.

There is little proliferation, as yet, of long-range land-attack cruise missiles. But because of the Tomahawk's apparent success in the Gulf War, indigenous development programs for long-range cruise missiles can be anticipated among proliferant nations. These nations may also purchase technology, hardware, and complete systems from other countries.

ACQUISITION AND PROTECTION OF STRATEGIES

Countries intent on obtaining NBC weapons or missile capabilities must either buy the necessary hardware or establish their own capability. In the case of military attack, they also must devise ways to protect their capabilities from destruction. These countries use a variety of covert and overt strategies to attain their goals, all of which make it difficult for us to determine the status of their programs.

• Some countries establish purchasing networks to conceal the supplier or recipient of foreign assistance. Typical networks feature the use of front companies and intermediaries in several countries to mask the transfer of the technology or equipment. Other key linkages of a covert network include banks, false end user certificates, numerous transshipment points, and several methods of shipment.
• Some countries exploit dual-use technologies to conceal the actual intended application of imported items. Much of the technology, components, or production facilities needed for the production of NBC weapons or missiles may have peaceful purposes. Such dual-use items are difficult to track, particularly as a proliferator is likely to claim a benign or legitimate use for them. For example:



• The key ingredients of nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, have potential civil uses as reactor fuel to produce electricity or for research.
• Many precursor chemicals have dual uses: Thiodiglycol, previously used for ballpoint ink, can be converted to mustard agent by a simple (single) chlorination step.
• Fermenters used in the production of beer, antibiotics, enzymes, and other therapeutic products, such as insulin and growth hormone, can also be used to produce significant quantities of biological warfare agent.
• The hardware, technology, and production facilities of SLVs are essentially interchangeable with those of ballistic missiles.
• UAVs for the delivery of insecticide are adaptable as cruise missiles for the delivery of chemical or biological agents.
• With the removal of specialized equipment for tracking an airplane, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) can be adapted as single-purpose ballistic missiles as shown on the chart:

• Some countries conceal NBC facilities to protect them from attack by constructing underground and other hardened facilities. Placing an NBC capability -- a weapon, a delivery system, or a production complex -- within a hardened facility enhances a country's ability to conceal the facility's location, while providing additional protection against attack. Outer perimeter protection in such facilities may involve concrete and steel roofs with earth cover. Other options include use of tunnels, including existing coal and salt mine complexes and natural caves that can be both deep and extensive. Within a hardened complex such measures as blast doors, barriers, turns in tunnels, and expansion chambers can channel and deflect blast waves, mitigating weapon effects.

The Iraqi facilities attacked during the Gulf War were for the most part from an early generation of protective facilities construction. Because of the success achieved by U.S. weapons against these type facilities, a new trend has been observed: the use of deep underground facilities such as abandoned mines or tunnels into hills and mountains. Modern excavating equipment has speeded the process of constructing such facilities and has reduced construction costs.

• Countries routinely use denial and deception to in order conceal research, development, production, and storage programs and facilities; to prevent detection of illicit technology acquisition efforts; to degrade international efforts to detect and confirm undeclared programs; to hide noncompliance with arms control agreements; and to ensure wartime survival of sensitive programs and facilities.

States use methods such as official secrecy, clandestine acquisition programs, signals security, emissions control, disguised or fake installations and equipment, underground facilities, environmental shielding, and technical camouflage to hide their programs. Finally, states use deceptive measures such as false official cover stories and disinformation.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES

Introduction

A number of technologies and technology applications support the development and use of NBC weapons and associated delivery systems. Among the most critical are those that improve proliferants' ability to locate targets, accurately deliver munitions, and thwart non- and counterproliferation.

Target Acquisition

In order to make effective use of NBC weapons, proliferants must have accurate information concerning the location and status of targets -- what is the precise distance and direction between the launch points of the NBC delivery systems and the intended target? -- what ports and airfields are supporting operations?

Until very recently, it was difficult for most states to obtain this information for distant targets. While some mechanisms were available, for example, overflight by reconnaissance aircraft, these entailed risk and might not provide all of the needed information. Maps might be consulted; however, many are inaccurate or do not contain all of the military targets of interest.

The availability of satellite imagery has had a major impact on the ability of proliferants to obtain the data needed for effective targeting. The key systems here have been SPOT and LANDSAT -- French and American satellites, respectively, that provide imagery. In peacetime, data from these satellites is commercially available. More recently, data from Russian imagery satellites has also become available on the open market.

SPOT and LANDSAT can provide reasonably high resolution images in the range of 10-30 meters. Resolution refers to the size of an object on the ground that can be seen in the sense that it can be distinguished from other objects. Location accuracy depends on the availability of reference information -- visible known locations that can be identified. For SPOT, accuracies on the order of 15 meters or better are possible when imagery covers areas with known and precisely located reference points. Depending on the number of SPOT or LANDSAT satellites that are in orbit, considerable time can transpire between successive images of the same location.

During the Gulf War, Iraq did not have access to imagery from SPOT and LANDSAT. Coalition forces, on the other hand, made use of both satellites. While neither satellite has the very high resolution needed to distinguish individual vehicle-size objects, both provided useful wide-area views of the theater to Coalition forces.

During peacetime, proliferants might make use of imagery from SPOT and LANDSAT to develop accurate maps of targets in other states. Civilian use of these systems has shown that some maps, particularly for areas in the developing world, can have significant errors (cities mislocated by miles). Useful information might also be developed concerning military capabilities, such as the locations of airfields that might be used by military forces during a conflict.

In the future, higher resolution data is likely to be commercially available to include 1-meter-scale data from U.S. firms and 5-meter-resolution imagery from the next generation of SPOT satellites. Currently, advertised resolutions (which are best possible values) might not be achieved if the target of interest is not aligned with the satelliteÕs track. The payoff from this access to satellite imagery would be the ability to identify the ports, airfields, and other facilities that are in use and to obtain information concerning the dispositions and locations of military forces not otherwise subject to observation. Iraq, for example, might have used such a capability to discover that Coalition forces had shifted their positions prior to ground operations in Operation Desert Storm. Access to timely imagery of at least moderate resolution would be a significant improvement in military capabilities.

Accurate Guidance and Navigation

The availability of low cost systems that provide high accuracy navigation and guidance is a recent development. NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS (its Russian counterpart) use constellations of satellites to send signals that can be utilized to provide high accuracy navigation. GPS receivers are available in stores and catalogs at prices of $200-$500.

GPS broadcasts protected military and in-the-clear civil signals with accuracies of less than 10 meters and 30-50 meters, respectively. If the Selective Availability security feature is removed from GPS, it will provide in-the-clear accuracy of approximately 3-5 meters.

The accuracy of navigation can be improved considerably by performing sophisticated processing on the GPS signal or by combining information from GPS with location data provided by other sources such fixed reference stations (differential GPS) or inertial measurement systems.

GPS is based on signals that are broadcast by satellites. As is the case with any signal, attempts might be made to jam a GPS-equipped delivery system. This might be done with systems that have limited range located near probable targets (NBC facilities). The effectiveness of such jamming interference would depend on a number of factors; for example, is GPS the only guidance system employed or is it complemented by other navigation aides?

Measures to Challenge Non- and Counterproliferation

A primary concern here involves the deliberate collocation of NBC facilities near civilian populations and facilities that the United States and its allies and coalition partners might be reluctant to attack due to civilian casualty considerations (see above). Responses include development and utilization of improved precision-delivery munitions and improved capabilities for the prediction and mitigation of collateral effects.

CONCLUSION

Acquisition of NBC weapons, missiles and other delivery systems, and supporting technologies is considerably easier than was the case in the 1940s and 1950s, when most of the declared nuclear powers developed their nuclear arsenals. There has been a diffusion of the technologies that enable proliferation, a number of which have legitimate civilian applications and are inherently dual-use.

Military counterproliferation planning must have two focuses. The first involves current threats, as reviewed in Section I. These risks involve known instances of NBC proliferation. While there is no question but that the world is a safer place than it was at the height of the Cold War in terms of the risk of a major strategic conflict, significant threats to U.S. national security persist.

The second focus involves potential threats. No one writing this document 10 years ago would have had the foresight to predict the end of the Cold War or the Gulf War. In an uncertain world, all potential antagonisms cannot be forecast. Hence, some planning and investments cannot be adversary-specific and must instead address the types of threats that are enabled by the availability of relevant, state-of-the-art technologies.

The character of warfare has changed. Just as military planners must assume that antagonists may have armored forces and combat aircraft, planning for major regional conflicts must give consideration to the possibility that adversaries may have NBC weapons and the means to deliver them.

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